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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

HE SUPREME COURrr
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
[46 C.2d 3; 291 P.2d 9291

[S. 11'. No.19347.

In Bank.

Dec. 29, 1955.]

ROGERS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent.
Prohibition-Application of Rules-Criminal ProceedingsAccusatory Pleading.-A writ of prohibition cannot be used to
review the rulings on the admissibility of evidence received by
the magistrate at the preliminary hearing; the scope of review
is simply to determine whether the magistrate has held defendant to answer without reasonable or probable cause to believe
a public offense has been committed with which defendant
is connected, and not whether the magistrate erred on questions
of admissibility of evidence, although a defendant is held
to answer without reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is based entirely on incompetent evidence. (See Pen.
Code, §§ 995, 999a.)
Indictment and Information-Necessity for.~A court has no
jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of an offense without a
valid indictment or information. ( Const., art. I, § 8; Pen.
Code, § 682.)
See Cal.Jur., Prohibition, § 21; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 22.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 7] Prohibition,§ 44; [2] Indictment
and Information, § 1; [3] Prohibition, § 16(1); [5, 6] Criminal
§ 175; [8] Criminal Law, § 177; (9] Criminal Law, § 16:-l:
Criminal Law, § 465; [11] Criminal Law, § 485; [12-14]
Criminal I~aw, § 467.
( 3)
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Prohibition-Grounds-Excess of Jurisdiction.--Prohibition is
the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in excess of
jurisdiction.
[ 4] !d.-Application of Rules-Criminal Proceedings-Accusatory
Pleading.-Prohibition is an appropriate means to test the
right of the People to proceed with a
validity of an indictment or information is ""'u''·""F;
ground that defendant has been indicted
committed without reasonable or probable cause.
[5] Criminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer
-Sufficient Cause.-"Sufficient cause" and "reasonable and
probable cause" mean such a state of facts as would lead a
man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the accused's guilt,
but the proof which will authorize a magistrate in holding the
accused for trial must consist of legal, competent evidence.
(Pen. Code, § 871.)
[6] !d.-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer--Sufficient
Cause.-An information that is based entirely on hearsay or
incompetent evidence is unauthorized.
[7] Prohibition-Application of Rules-Criminal ProceedingsAccusatory Pleading.-When prohibition is sought under Pen.
Code, § 999a, on the ground that petitioner has been committed
without reasonable or probable cause, the writ will issue if no
competent evidence was offered at the preliminary examination
to support a reasonable belief that the offense charged was
committed and that defendant committed it.
[8] Criminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer
-Sufficient Cause.-Testimony to the effect that unknown
persons posed as being able to obtain the release of a missing
girl for ransom, when offered merely to show that the conversation was held and not to prove the truth of the statements
made by unidentified callers, is not hearsay, but is competent
and supports a reasonable belief that the offenses of attempted
extortion (Pen. Code, § 524) and posing as kidnappers for
the purpose of extorting money (Pen. Code, § 210), with which
the accused persons are charged, were committed.
[9] !d.-Preliminary Proceedings-Rights of Defendant.-Detention of defendant beyond the 48-hour statutory maximum without being taken before a magistrate (Pen. Code, § 825) is
illegal.
[10] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-A pretrial confession is admissible, so far as due process is concerned, if it is voluntarily
made.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Prohibition, § 4; Am.Jur., Prohibition, §§ 20, 24.
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Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-The test ordinarily used by
state courts to determine the admissibility of a confession is
considering the circumstances, it was freely and
voluntarily made without any inducement held out to the
accused.
Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-California has not adopted the
federal rule that a confession made during a period of illegal
detention is inadmissible.
Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-There is a basic distinction between evidence seized in violation of the search and seizure
of the federal and state Constitutions and voluntary
statements made during a period of illegal detention; such a
voluntary admission is not a necessary product of the illegal
detention, whereas evidence obtained by an illegal search or
a coerced confession is the necessary product of the search
or of the coercion.
!d.-Evidence-Confessions.-Where there is no evidence that
defendant's illegal detention produced admissions made to the
police, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Alameda County from further proceedings under an
information. ·writ denied.
William H. Coburn, Jr., for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, Arlo E. Smith, Deputy
General, and J. F. Coakley, District Attorney (Ala' for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner and L. C. Elliot were charged
one count of an information with posing as kidnappers for
purpose of extorting money (Pen. Code, § 210) and, in
another count with attempted extortion. (Pen. Code, § 524.)
Petitioner's motion under section 995 of the Penal Code to set
the information on the ground that there is no reasonable
probable cause to believe that he committed the offenses
was denied, and he now seeks prohibition to prevent
further proceedings against him. (See Pen. Code, § 999a.)
District Court of Appeal issued the alternative writ,
and the cause was thereafter transferred to this court.
[11] Admissibility of confession as affected by delay in arraignment of prisoner, note, 19 A.L.R.2d 1331. See also Cal.Jur.2d,
Evidence, § 131; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 482.
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daughter of Dr. Charles
Jr., disappeared. Late in the
of April
28th or 29th, Dr. Bryan received a telephone call, and an
unknown voice advised him that if he delivered $5,000 at a
specified location his daughter would be released. When he
asked for proof that the caller had his daughter another
voice replied, ''I ain't got no proof, it is just a chance you
will have to
bring it to Eighth and Market and she will
be turned loose." The second voice also stated that "If
there is any slip-ups it will be your daughter's life, not mine."
In addition to the foregoing evidence, admissions made to the
police by the defendants following their arrest were introduced at the preliminary hearing. Petitioner was arrested
on lVIay 17, 1955, and was not taken before a magistrate
and arraigned untillVIay 25, 1955. It was during this period,
on lVIay 21st, that he made the admissions to the arresting
officer that connect him with the crime.
Petitioner contends that his commitment was based entirely
on incompetent evidence and that the peremptory writ should
thentfore issue. He claims that without his admissions there
was no evidence to connect him with the crime and that his
admissions were inadmissible on the grounds that there was
no competent proof of the corpns delicti and that they come
within the exclusionary rule of People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d
434 [282 P.2d 905], since they were made during the period
of his illegal detention in violation of section 825 of the
Penal Code.
[1] The attorney general contends that the writ of prohibition cannot be used to review the rulings on the admissibility of evidence received by the magistrate at the preliminary
examination, that to construe sections 995* and 999a t of the
*''The indictment or information must be set aside by the court in
which the defendant is arraigned, upon his motion, in either of the
following cases:
''If it be an indictment:
'' 1. Where it is not found, endorsed, and presented as prescribed in
this code.
'' 2. That the defendant has been indicted without reasonable or probable cause.
"If it be an information:
'' 1. That before the filing thereof the defendant had not been legally
committed by a magistrate.
'' 2. That the defendant had been committed without reasonable or
probable cause.''
t' 'A petition for a writ of prohibition, predicated upon the ground
that the indictment was found without reasonable or probable cause or
that the defendant had been committed on an information without reason-

RoGERS

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

[46 C.2d 3; 291 P.2d 929]

7

Code as providing for a full scale review of the rulings
be contrary to the purpose of the preliminary examiand that the scope of review is simply to determine
the magistrate has held the defendant to answer
reasonable or probable cause to believe a public
bas been committed with which the defendant is conand not whether the magistrate erred on questions of
of evidence. We agree with this contention with
this qualification : A defendant has been held to answer
without reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is
entirely on incompetent evidence, and for the following
reasons the peremptory writ will issue to prohibit further
proceedings against him.
[2] A court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial
of an offense without a valid indictment or information.
v. Superior Cour·t, 19 Cal.2d 319, 321 [121 P.2d
Cal. Const., art. I, § 8; Pen. Code, § 682.) [3, 4] Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent threatened action in
excess of jurisdiction (Harden v. Sttper·ior Court, 44 Cal.2d
637 [284 P.2d 9] ; Rescue Army v. Mtmicipal Court, 28
Cal.2d 460, 463 [171 P.2d 8]), and it is an appropriate means
ro test the right of the People to proceed with a prosecution
when the validity of an indictment or information is chalon the ground that the defendant has been indicted
or committed without reasonable or probable cause. (Greenv. S1tperior Court, supra, 19 Cal.2d 319, 323; Whitlock v.
Court, 97 Cal.App.2d 26, 30 [217 P.2d 158]; Jackson
v. Superior Conrt, 98 Cal.App.2d 183, 189 [219 P.2d 879] ;
!Iall v. Superior Court, 120 Cal.App.2d 844, 850 [262 P.2d
; Pen. Code, §§ 995, 999a.)
[5] Section 871 of the Penal Code provides: ''If, after
the p1·oo{s, it appears that either no public offense
has been committed or that there is not sufficient cause to
believe the defendant guilty of a public offense, the magistrate must order the defendant to be discharged, . . . " (Italics
"Sufficient canse" and "reasonable and probable
" mean such a state of facts as would lead a man of
ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously
able or probable eau~e, must be flied in the appellate court within 15
after a motion made uudcr Seetion 99:! of this code to set aside
indictment on the ground tlmt the defendant has been indicted with
ont reasonahle or prohal>le eause or that the defendant has been committ(•d on an information without reasonable or probable cause, has been
denied by the trial court. . . . "
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a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused
v. Nagel, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222 [153 P.2d 344] ), but,
proof which will authorize a magistrate in holding
an accused person for trial must consist of legal, competent
evidence. No other type of evidence may be considered by
the magistrate. The rules of evidence require the 'production
of legal evidence' and the exclusion of 'whatever is not legal'
(Code Civ. Proc., §1825; . . . )." (People v.
71
Cal.App.2d 773, 775 [163 P.2d 498].) [6] An information
that is based entirely on hearsay or incompetent evidence is
unauthorized. (In re Flodstrom, 134 Oal.App.2d 871 [277 P.2d
101]; Hall v. Superior Court, 120 Cal.App.2d 844, 850 [262
P.2d 351]; Dong Haw v. Superior Court, 81 Oal.App.2d 153,
159 [183 P.2d 724] ; People v. Schuber, s1tpm, 71 Oal.App.2d
773, 777; In re Schuber, 68 Oal.App.2d 424, 425 [156 P.2d
944]; In re Martinez, 36 Oal.App.2d 687, 689 [98 P.2d 528] ;
see also People v. Proctor, 108 Oal.App.2d 739, 742 [239 P.2d
697]; 7 Oal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 120, p. 984.) [7] Accordingly, when prohibition is sought under section 999a of
the Penal Code, the writ will issue if no competent evidence
was offered at the preliminary examination to support a
reasonable belief that the offense charged was committed and
that the defendant committed it.
Petitioner bases his contention that there was no competent
proof of the corpus delicti and that therefore his admissions
were not admissible against him, on the ground that since
Dr. Bryan was unable to identify the voices he heard over
the telephone, his testimony concerning the call is inadmissible
hearsay. The testimony, however, to the effect that unknown
persons posed as being able to obtain the release of Dr. Bryan's
daughter for ransom, was offered merely to show that the
conversation was held, and not to prove the truth of the
statements made by the unidentified callers. Such evidence
is not hearsay. (People v. Kelley, 22 Oal.2d 169, 176 [137
P.2d 1] ; People v. MacArtJwr, 125 Oal.App.2d 212, 219 [270
P.2d 37]; People v. Henry, 86 Cal.App.2d 785, 789 [195 P.2d
478]; People v. Klein, 71 Oal.App.2d 588, 592 [163 P.2d 71];
People v. Radley, 68 Oal..App.2d 607, 609 [157 P.2d 426];
People v. Gaertner, 43 Oal.App.2d 388, 395 [110 P.2d 1002] .)
[8] The testimony was not only competent, but it covered
each of the essential elements of the crimes charged and
supports a reasonable belief that these offenses were committed. We thus reach petitioner's basic contention that his
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no doubt that the admissions were made during
of
detention. The arresting officer testified
arrested defendant on the afternoon of May 17th. The
was held at about 10 :15 a.m. on May 21st, or
90 hours after the arrest. Even then defendnot taken before the mag·istrate until l\Iay 25th, eight
his arrest. [9] Section 825 of the Penal Code
defendant must iu all cases be taken before the magiswithout unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within
after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holi-

"
is nothing to indicate that a magistrate was unavailon the 'l'uesday afternoon of the arrest or at sometime
the 48-hour period following it. Detention beyond
48-hour statutory maximum without being taken before
is unquestionably illegal.*
this state the admissibility of voluntary admissions or
C(lllfessions made during illegal detention was first questioned
v. Devine, 46 Cal. 45, 48. The contention that
conversations with the police officer illegally detaindefendant were inadmissible, solely by reason of the illegal
was rejected as unfounded in principle or authority.
that time, however, the federal courts have adopted
rule that a confession during a period of illegal detention
inadmissible (UcNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 [63
S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819], rehearing denied, 319 U.S. 784 [63
1322, 87 ll.Ed. 1727]; Upshaw v. United States, 335
.S. 410, 413 [69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100]; "[A] confesis illadmissible if made during illegal detention due to
failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing
whether or not the 'confession is the result of
physical or psychological.' '' Un,ited States v. Leviton,
F.2d 848, 853), but, "[T]he rule of the McNabb case,
. is not a limitation imposed by the Due Process Clause.
Citations.] Compliance with the MeN abb rule is required
federal courts by [the Supreme Court] through its power
supervision over the procedure and practices of federal
*Section 14i1 of the Penal Code provides: "Every public officer or
person, having arrested any person upon a criminal charge, who
willfully delays to take such person before a magistrate having jurisdiction, to take his examination, is guilty of a misdemeanor.''
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courts in the trial of criminal cases.'' (Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55, 63, 64 [72 S.Ct. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86].) [10] A
pretrial confession is admissible, so far as due process is
concerned, if it is voluntarily made. (Gallegos v. Nebraska,
S1tpra, 342 U.S. 55, 65; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
285, 286 [56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682]; Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 236, 238 [60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716]; Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 238 [62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166] .)
'I'here is no contention in this case that the admissions were
involuntary.
[11] The test ordinarily used by state courts to determine
the admissibility of a confession is, whether, considering all
the circumstances, it >vas freely and voluntarily made without
any inducement held out to the accused. (See 19 A.L.R.2d
Ul32, 1336-1346; 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 482.) [12] Since
the McNabb case, the state courts that have had occasion
to reevaluate their test of admissibility as it applies to a confession made during illegal detention continue to treat delay
in arraignment as only one of the factors to be considered in
determining whether the statement was voluntarily made.
Apparently none of the states following the rule excluding
illegally obtained evidence have adopted the rule of the
McNabb case; and we are not disposed to adopt it.
[13] There is a basic distinction between evidence seized
in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the Con~>titution of the United States and the Constitution of California and the laws enacted thereunder, and voluntary statements made dnring a period of illegal detention. It may be
trne, as petitioner contends, that had he been arraigned within
48 hours and advised of his rights, he would not have volunteered to say anything. ( Cf. People v. Stroble, 36 Cal.2d 615,
G26, 627 [226 P.2d 330] ; and see People v. Zarnmora, 66 Cal.
App.2d 166, 220 [ 152 P.2d 180].) Nevertheless, there is
lacking the essential connection between the illegal detention
and the voluntary statements made during that detention that
there is between the illegal search and the evidence obtained
thereby, or between the coercion and the confession induced
thereby. The voluntary admission is not a necessary product
of the illegal detention; the evidence obtained by an illegal
search or by a coerced confession is the necessary product of
the search or of the coercion. ·when questioned by arresting
ofiicers a suspect may remain silent or make only such statements as serve his interest; the victim of an illegal search,
however, has no opportunity to select the items to be taken
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rummaging officer (State v. Sanford, State v. Ellis, 354
1012 [193 S.W.2d 37, 38] concurring opinion of
J. State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179 [75 A.2d 429,
Milbourn v. State, 212 Ind. 161 [8 N.E.2d 985,
Qttan v. State, 185 Miss. 513 [188 So. 568, 569] ; 14 So.
4 77), and the victim of a coerced confession has
deprived of any choice. [14] The record of the preexamination is devoid of any implication that the
in this case was resorted to for the purpose of
'L'"''vu.• "" the admissions, and petitioner makes no contention
they were not freely and voluntarily made. Accordingly,
there is no evidence that the illegal detention produced
admissions, we find the exclusionary rule inapplicable.
The alternative writ of prohibition is discharged, and a
peremptory writ is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J. pro
* concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I agree with all of the opinion except that portion which
holds that admissions or confessions of a defendant are admissible against him even though they are obtained while he
being illegally detained contrary to section 825 of the Penal
Code, quoted in the majority opinion. I believe that we
should follow the federal rule as announced by the United
States Supreme Court (Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410
S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 [63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819] ). One of the reasons
the provisions that a person arrested be promptly taken
before a magistrate such as section 825 of the Penal Code
is: " . . . to check resort by officers to 'secret interrogation of
prrsons accused of crime.'" (Upshaw v. United States,
supra, 335 U.S. 410, 412.) In McNa'bb v. United States, supra,
318 U.S. 332, 343, the court said after pointing out the rule
that a person must be promptly charged after arrest: "The
purpose of tl1is impressively pervasive requirement of criminal
procedure is plain. A democratic society, in which respect
the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking
down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone
*.Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

L
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prevent disregard of cherished liberties.
fore counseled that safeguards must be provided
dangers of the overzealous as well as the
'l'he awful
instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a
single functionary. The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts,
for
which is separately vested in the various
whom the criminal law relies for its vindication. Legislation
such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable
promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons,
constitutes an important safeguard-not only in
protection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of
the guilty by methods that comnwncl themselves to a progressive and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as
the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as
indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid
all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons
accused of crime. It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy
view of law enforcement. It outlaws easy but self-defeating
ways in which brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection. A statute carrying such purposes
is expressive of a general legislative policy to which courts
should not be heedless when appropriate situations call for
its application." And in the same vein ·william \Vicker,
Dean of the University of Tennessee College of Law, says:
"The objectives of prompt-arraignment statutes include giving the suspect a preliminary hearing before a committing
official, informing him as to his constitutional privilege of
remaining silent, and affording him an opportunity to obtain
counsel and secure bail. Holding the suspect incommunicado
furnishes the setting most favorable for obtaining a confession.
A high percentage of improperly induced confessions occur
\Vhile the suspect is being held 'on ice' in violation of arraignment statutes. This kind of violation of a duty towards a
suspect involves very little risk from the standpoint of the
lawless police officer. A prosecuting attorney will very seldom,
if ever, use a confession obtained by his investigating officer
and then prosecute the officer for illegally obtaining the
confession. Furthermore, even a successful criminal prosecution gives no redress to the victim. There are also obvious
practical obstacles to a convicted criminal's successfully maintaining a civil suit for damages against an officer who illegally
detained him and thereby obtained the evidence to convict
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Yictim dares to
a civil action, he is not only
and the risk of wasting time and money,
the risk of creating such a degree of ill-feeling
himsel£ and the police that he may have reason to
retribution. If the victim obtains a judgment, the
be JJominal. Even if the victim obtains a subit often eannot be collected out of a police
Vand.L.Hev. 507, 511.)
(Pen. Code, §
825) make it mandatory
a person arrested be taken before a magistrate without
in no case less than two days and an officer
the section is subject to imprisonment in the county
exceeding six months or fine not exceeding $500 or
Code,
19, 145.) Unless admissions or confesare excluded when obtained in violation of those proviwill have little force. The situation is not different
the unlawful search and seizure cases (People v. Cahan,
Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905] ). 'l'he distinction suggested
the majority opinion, that is, that an admission obtained
illegal detention is not necessarily the product of the
detention while the goods unlawfully seized are a
product of the illegal seizure, fails to take into
a(:count that the purpose of the speedy taking of a prisoner
before a magistrate is to avoid confessions or admissions before
person is advised of the charges against him and his right
etc. Necessarily embraced within that purpose is
that such admissions obtained during illegal
l'Cstraint will be coerced. Moreover, the purpose being as
heretofore stated the Ijrgislature has decided by making the
(Pen. Code, § 825) that admissions so obtained
a product of the illegal detention and the
coerc:ion inherent therein.
appears to be the settled rule both in California and
the United States that where a statute provides
certain conduct shall be penalized, rights assertedly based
such conclnet are yoid, of no effect, and hence unenforceeven though the statute does not specifically so declare.
of Oakland v. California Canst. Co., 15 Cal.2d 573
P.2d 30]; Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119 [57 P. 777,
;\m.St.Hep. 31, 45 L.RA. 420] ; Adams v. JJfinor, 121 Cal.
[53 P. 815]; j}Jeyer v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. 102
P. 434, 66 Am.St.Rep. 22, 41 L.R.A. 762] ; Viscdia Gas &
B. L. Co. v. Sims, 104 Cal. 326 [37 P. 1042, 43 Am.St.Rep.
; JJ1oTill v. Nightingale, 93 Cal. 452 [28 P. 1068, 27
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Am.St.Rep. 207]; Gardner v. Tatum, 81 Cal. 370 [22 P.
880] ; Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lbr. Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal.
387 [18 P. 391, 9 Am.St.Rep. 211] ; Swanger v. Mayberry,
59 Cal. 91; Raymmzd v. Bartlett, 77 Cal.App.2d 283 [175 P.2d
288]; Salada Beaoh etc. Dist. v. Anderson, 50 Cal.App.2d
306 [123 P.2d 86j; Cmtnty of Marin v. Messner, 44 CaL
App.2d 577 [112 P.2d 731]; Miller v. City of Martinez, 28
Oal.App.2d 364 [82 P.2d 519]; City
Los Angeles v. Watterson, 8 Cal.App.2d 331 [48 P.2d 87]; Hobbs, Wall & Co. v.
Moran, 109 Oal.App. 316 [293 P. 145] ; County of Shasta v.
Moody, 90 Cal.App. 519 [265 P. 1032]; Noble v. City of Palo
Alto, 89 Cal.App. 47 [264 P. 529] ; Nielson v. Richards, 75
Cal.App. 680 [243 P. 697] ; Stockton Plumbing ete. Co. v.
Wheeler, 68 Cal.App. 592 [229 P. 1120].) It should follow
from the foregoing that since the detention here was in
violation of express statutory authority, anything obtained by
the prosecution from the defendant while subjected to such
unlawful detention could not be relied upon in support of
the charge against him.
For the foregoing reasons I would grant the relief prayed
for.
Schauer, J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 19373.

In Bank.

Dec. 29, 1955.]

GARY B. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. E. W. ROBINSON
VAN LINES (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[1] Carriers-Passengers-Appeal- Reversible Error- Instruc-

tions.-In an action by a caretaker of race horses against trucking companies transporting them to recover for injuries received
when he fell through the open door of a truck, permitting the
jury to have knowledge of the provisions of a contract between the owner of the horses and the companies, without
cautioning them that the clause indemnifying the trucking companies against liability for injuries sustained by the owner's
employees did not affect the caretaker's right as against such
companies, resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Carriers, § 42 et seq.; Am.Jur., Carriers,
§ 1666 et seq.

McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Carriers, § 155(3).

